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THE CORRUPTION OF LIBERAL 
AND SOCIAL DEMOCRACIES 
Timothy K. Kuhner* 
 
Thomas Piketty repeats throughout Capital in the Twenty-First Century 
that today’s levels of inequality are not inevitable, much less natural, and 
has connected the state of democracy worldwide to rising economic 
inequality.  Wealth transfers from the state to the private sector, wealth 
transfers from labor to capital, and tax laws favorable to the concentration 
of wealth require that the participatory and representative facets of 
democracy be kept in check.  Beyond suitable material conditions, the 
growth and maintenance of inequality necessitates a justificatory ideology.  
This Article explores the possibility that the laws of political finance can 
help connect the dots.  Legal patterns in the financing of campaigns and 
political parties point to two distinct forms of oligarchy in play:  
plutocracy, representing the decay of liberal democracy, and partyocracy, 
representing the decay of social democracy.  Together, these legal forms of 
corruption appear to have co-opted democracy’s values and outputs, 
paving the way for neoliberalism.  This Article focuses on plutocracy, the 
form of corruption most affecting the United States at present. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Goldburn P. Maynard Jr. writes that “the federal estate tax remains the 
only levy that is meant specifically to combat the concentration of wealth in 
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the hands of the few.”1  He attributes the success of the movement to 
weaken this tax to more than just money in politics.2  Beyond lobbyists and 
elite control of democracy, Professor Maynard adopts the view that “tax 
policy is more about ideology than facts”—the success of a narrative that 
values and celebrates wealth.3  This Article discusses components of money 
in politics that, with varying degrees of directness, shed light on the 
concentration of wealth, the weakening of the estate tax, and the ideological 
bases for both. 
It is questionable whether the estate tax and other progressive 
government policies can endure for long when elections and outside 
political speech are financed by an increasingly small portion of wealthy 
Americans.4  As a result of Supreme Court decisions handed down on 
matters of campaign finance and outside spending,5 American democracy 
bears witness to the concentration of political power in the hands of the 
few—namely, the same demographic that would benefit from the repeal of 
the estate tax.  The question then becomes:  What connections exist 
between the concentration of wealth in the hands of the few and the 
concentration of political power in the same hands? 
Possible causal connections have been the subject of a major tax exposé 
in the New York Times.6  The Times article begins by discussing how two 
notable “hedge fund magnates” have invested millions of dollars in political 
spending.  It quickly reaches general conclusions, including this one: 
[T]he very richest Americans have financed a sophisticated and 
astonishingly effective apparatus for shielding their fortunes [and] this 
apparatus has become one of the most powerful avenues of influence for 
wealthy Americans, [all of whom are] among a small group providing 
much of the early cash for the 2016 presidential campaign.7 
The barely veiled allegation conveyed by the Times is that the wealthiest 
Americans have succeeded in using political spending to preserve—if not 
create—tax loopholes.  As Jared Bernstein put it, “[T]he wealthy use their 
money to buy politicians; more accurately, it’s that they can buy policy, and 
specifically, tax policy.”8 
Logically speaking, political power in the hands of the wealthy can be 
expected to lead to policy changes benefitting the wealthy.  Beyond these 
 
 1. Goldburn P. Maynard Jr., Perpetuating Inequality by Taxing Wealth, 84 FORDHAM 
L. REV. 2429, 2429 (2016). 
 2. Id. at 2447 (discussing MICHAEL J. GRAETZ & IAN SHAPIRO, DEATH BY A THOUSAND 
CUTS:  THE FIGHT OVER TAXING INHERITANCE (2005) (recounting the political saga that was 
the repeal of the estate tax in 2001)). 
 3. Id. 
 4. See infra notes 115–19 and accompanying text. 
 5. See infra Part III. 
 6. Noam Scheiber & Patricia Cohen, For the Wealthiest, a Private Tax System That 
Saves Them Billions, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 29, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/ 
12/30/business/economy/for-the-wealthiest-private-tax-system-saves-them-billions.html? 
smprod=nytcore-iphone&smid=nytcore-iphone-share&_r=0 [https://perma.cc/7Q6S-49WB]. 
 7. Id. 
 8. Id. (quoting Jared Berstein). 
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material similarities and connections between political and economic 
inequality, however, this Article sides with Professor Maynard’s views on 
the importance of ideology.9  It suggests an underlying ideological affinity 
between political and economic inequalities.  That affinity is well illustrated 
by an exploration of how liberal democracy and social democracy differ 
from each other and how the corruption of the former is accomplished by an 
extreme rejection of the latter.  Any tax regime that disproportionately 
benefits the wealthy is tied up, after all, with a rejection of social 
democracy and an increasingly emaciated view of liberal democratic 
commitments. 
I.  INTRODUCTION TO NEOLIBERALISM 
AND POLITICAL FINANCE 
Established democracies have long been home to debates over “social” 
versus “liberal” types of democracy and capitalism.  The fall of the Soviet 
Union and subsequent globalization of democracy made this debate the 
defining issue of the last quarter century.10  From questions of freedom, 
privatization, and economic deregulation, to questions of equality, 
entitlements, and taxation, the fundamental structure of this debate is 
whether interests and ideologies of a capitalist or democratic character will 
govern society.  As of 2016, that latest stage of history has ended, and the 
time has come to announce the winner:  neither liberal democracy nor social 
democracy, but corrupt mutations of both, which have made easy prey for 
neoliberalism. 
As of the 1970s, liberalism—the political philosophy and mode of 
government—was still broad enough to accommodate ethical concerns over 
market excesses, equality, the development of capacities, and meaningful 
political participation for ordinary citizens.  Democratic governments took 
programmatic steps that reflected not just classical liberalism, but also 
ethical and social liberalism, to the happy effect that one could mention 
John Locke as well as the other Johns (Stuart Mill and Rawls) in the same 
sentence.  The reach of the market was often circumscribed in the interest of 
community values and public goods, including the stability of the market 
itself.  In sum, Keynesians and neoclassists still enjoyed a healthy rivalry.11 
Sporadically in the 1980s and consistently thereafter, however, 
neoliberalism gained ground on liberalism.  An economic and political 
rejection of social, ethical, and regulatory stances, neoliberalism brought 
 
 9. See supra notes 1–4 and accompanying text. 
 10. While just one-third of all states in the mid-1980s were democracies, by 1999 two-
thirds of all states had converted to democracy. See James Crawford, Democracy and the 
Body of International Law, in DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 91, 95 
(Gregory H. Fox & Brad R. Roth eds., 2000).  In 1999, the number of democracies was 
reported as 120, or two-thirds of all states. See Democracy Momentum Sustained As, 
FREEDOM HOUSE (Dec. 21, 1999), https://freedomhouse.org/article/democracy-momentum-
sustained [https://perma.cc/DT8W-J9KL]. 
 11. See CHARLES DERBER & YALE R. MAGRASS, CAPITALISM SHOULD YOU BUY IT?:  AN 
INVITATION TO POLITICAL ECONOMY 33–34, 51–52 (2014) (summarizing the principles of 
neoclassical economics and Keynesian economics). 
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about the “‘economization’ of political life”12 for the purpose of “capital 
enhancement.”13  Finance capital, trade treaties, corporate lobbies, 
supranational institutions, and political parties succeeded in carrying out 
privatization and austerity measures on a global scale.14  As David Harvey 
notes, “There has everywhere been an emphatic turn . . . in political-
economic practices and thinking since the 1970s[:]  [d]eregulation, 
privatization, and withdrawal of the state from many areas of social 
provision have been all too common.”15 
The implementation of this neoliberal program involved a complex set of 
factors and events, including a solid degree of government capture by elites 
and an equally solid degree of ideological drift toward economic 
conceptions of political values.  This Article posits that some of that capture 
and drift occurred between 1970 and 2014 within a body of law called 
political finance.  While the term “campaign finance” is more common in 
presidential systems and “party finance” in parliamentary systems,16 they 
are both included in political finance, which refers to “disclosure, 
transparency, expenditure and contribution limits, as well as direct forms of 
public subsidies to parties and candidates.”17 
When contributions and expenditures are subject to few or no limits, and 
public subsidies are lacking, democracy morphs into a market for political 
power.  When such conditions are present in a polity with significant 
economic inequality, and when the regulation (or lack of regulation) of 
industries or individuals has real monetary value, it is common for large 
donors and spenders to exercise disproportionate influence over political 
parties, candidates, officeholders, and lawmaking.  As a 2003 USAID 
global report concluded, “Payback of campaign debts in the form of 
political favors breeds a type of corruption that is commonly encountered 
around the world.”18  Large expenditures by outside interests or by wealthy, 
self-financing candidates can achieve a similar result:  political power on 
 
 12. WENDY BROWN, UNDOING THE DEMOS:  NEOLIBERALISM’S STEALTH REVOLUTION 17 
(2015). 
 13. Id. at 22. 
 14. See, e.g., MARK BLYTH, AUSTERITY:  THE HISTORY OF A DANGEROUS IDEA (2015); 
DAVID HARVEY, A BRIEF HISTORY OF NEOLIBERALISM (2007); KERRY ANNE MENDOZA, 
AUSTERITY:  THE DEMOLITION OF THE WELFARE STATE AND THE RISE OF THE ZOMBIE 
ECONOMY (2014). 
 15. HARVEY, supra note 14, at 2–3. 
 16. See ARTHUR B. GUNLICKS, CAMPAIGN AND PARTY FINANCE IN NORTH AMERICA AND 
WESTERN EUROPE, at vii (2000) (noting that political finance “means campaign and 
candidate finance” in North America, whereas “[i]n Europe it is more likely to mean party 
finance”). 
 17. See, e.g., HERBERT E. ALEXANDER & JOEL FEDERMAN, COMPARATIVE POLITICAL 
FINANCE IN THE 1980S, at 1 (1989). 
 18. BUREAU FOR DEMOCRACY, CONFLICT, AND HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE, U.S. 
AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT, MONEY IN POLITICS HANDBOOK:  A GUIDE TO 
INCREASING TRANSPARENCY IN EMERGING DEMOCRACIES 7 (2003).  As Herbert E. Alexander 
and Rei Shiratori stated in their volume on comparative political finance, “[I]ncredibly large 
monetary contributions . . . have permeated the world of politics in most continents.” Herbert 
E. Alexander & Rei Shiratori, Introduction, in COMPARATIVE POLITICAL FINANCE AMONG 
THE DEMOCRACIES 1, 3 (Herbert E. Alexander & Rei Shiratori eds., 1994). 
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the basis of economic power, which, when consistent and widespread, 
translates to rule by or for the wealthy. 
On the other hand, when public subsidies are high and donations and 
expenditures are limited, candidates and parties gain a measure of 
independence from moneyed interests.  By drawing their own financing 
from the state, however, and controlling the amount, parties may gain a 
measure of independence not only from moneyed interests, but from their 
ordinary constituents as well.  In this vein, Brad Roth remarked that “[t]he 
universal franchise may allow all sectors of the society to select . . . from 
among pre-packaged candidates of parties controlled by social elites, but 
this scarcely implies the rudiments of accountability, let alone genuine 
popular empowerment.”19  Despite tremendous unpopularity, major parties 
may collude in order to legislate increasing state funds for themselves, thus 
disadvantaging, if not excluding, their competitors.  When consistent and 
widespread, such dynamics of cartelization, ossification, and exclusion 
translate into rule by and for the party. 
Although plutocracy and partyocracy arise from distinct configurations 
of political finance laws, they both serve to concentrate political power in 
elites—large political donors and spenders in the case of plutocracy and 
party officials and key party allies in the case of partyocracy.  The effect of 
distancing representatives from ordinary citizens places democratic 
representation in doubt, while an overpowering role for elites eclipses the 
possibility (or at least the value) of mass participation.  Plutocracy and 
partyocracy achieve this identical result through diametrically opposed 
ideological principles and patterns of funding.  These two forms of 
corruption prove something that is remarkable:  both liberal and social 
democracy can be converted into oligarchic forms of power from within, 
through ostensibly faithful exercises of constitutional law.  The subsequent 
hijacking of state power by market interests and ideologies is neither 
surprising nor all that difficult to accomplish.  The arduous and 
unpredictable component of neoliberalism’s triumph consists in interpreting 
and implementing constitutional provisions on pluralism, free speech, 
equality, and the general will so as to distance campaigns, officeholders, 
and political parties from popular control.  The de-democratization process 
requires co-opting the values of liberal democracy for illiberal ends and the 
values of social democracy for antisocial ends. 
II.  DEMOCRACIES AND CAPITALISMS 
In 1977, Charles Lindblom described the primary difference between 
governments as despotic versus libertarian—that is, governments that were 
inherently oppressive versus those that sought to employ freedom as their 
organizing principle.20  This was a common way to distinguish the forces at 
 
 19.  Brad R. Roth, Evaluating Democratic Progress, in DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE AND 
INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 10, at 502. 
 20. CHARLES E. LINDBLOM, POLITICS AND MARKETS, at ix (1977).  This characterization 
did of course ignore many complications and ironies, such as the willingness of libertarian 
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work during the Cold War.  But Lindblom then perceived the central 
question that would determine the shape of social order after communism’s 
collapse.  “Aside from the difference between despotic and libertarian 
governments,” he wrote, “the greatest distinction between one government 
and another is in the degree to which market replaces government or 
government replaces market.”21  Also writing in 1977 and perceiving the 
same distinction, C.B. Macpherson noted that “liberal democracy” was 
associated with two very different types of societies:  “the democracy of a 
capitalist market society . . . [or] a society striving to ensure that all its 
members are equally free to realize their capabilities.”22  This radical 
ambiguity within liberal democracy derived from a rift within liberalism 
between two types of freedom:  “freedom of the stronger to do down the 
weaker by following market rules [and] equal effective freedom of all to use 
and develop their capacities.”23 
Writing one year before Lindblom and Macpherson, Andrew Levine 
characterized social democracy as “the left-wing of liberalism” and resting 
on a faith in “the development of productive capacities and the progressive 
and continuous evolution of political forms.”24  According to Macpherson, 
that left wing of liberalism was required in order to help the West to 
compete on two fronts during the Cold War:  first, a competition with the 
East “for the esteem of the third world, the recently independent [] countries 
of Africa and Asia who have rejected liberal-democratic market values and 
institutions without embracing communist values and institutions,”25 and 
second, a competition between political leaders in the West “for the support 
of their own people [who] demand a levelling up.”26  Levine described 
Macpherson’s concern as “the spectre of proletarian revolution,”27 not just 
the people’s demand for more equality and less exploitation by capital.  
Although social democracy began as a working class movement opposed to 
capitalism, it came to serve as a defense against revolution within capitalist 
democracies, consisting in “reforms designed to mitigate capitalism’s worst 
features.”28 
In implementing such reforms, social democracy brings about a social 
form of capitalism.  Claus Offe describes that type of capitalism, which has 
been meaningfully tempered by democracy, as “‘organized,’ ‘embedded’ 
 
governments to support despotic governments that suppressed communist elements within 
their jurisdictions. 
 21.  Id.  Lindblom considered this to be the matter on which “[t]he operation of 
parliaments and legislative bodies, bureaucracies, parties, and interest groups depends.” Id. 
 22. See generally C.B. MACPHERSON, THE LIFE AND TIMES OF LIBERAL DEMOCRACY 1 
(2012). 
 23. Id. 
 24. Andrew Levine, The Political Theory of Social Democracy, 6 CAN. J. PHIL. 183, 192 
(1976). 
 25. C.B. MACPHERSON, DEMOCRATIC THEORY:  ESSAYS IN RETRIEVAL 22 (1973). 
 26. Id. 
 27. Levine, supra note 24, at 191. 
 28. Id. at 192. 
2016] CORRUPTION OF LIBERAL AND SOCIAL DEMOCRACIES 2459 
and ‘regulated’ capitalism”29 and as “(Continental) European capitalism.”30  
Informed by “the precepts of a ‘social’ market economy,”31 Offe contrasts 
it with the liberal or Anglo-American form of capitalism.  While European 
versus Anglo-American is the “coarsest distinction” between different 
forms of capitalism,32 it is important to consider those broad contours, 
because the material and ideological battles of recent years have unfolded 
along them:   
equality versus efficiency, collective bargaining versus individual 
contracting, cooperation versus conflict, rights versus resources, wage 
moderation versus distributive conflict, . . . social partnership versus class 
conflict, proportional representation versus 
majoritarianism, . . . associational collectivism versus individualism, 
social security versus competitiveness, [and] politics versus markets.33 
Offe explains that a defining feature of European capitalism and social 
order is its tendency toward the first choice in each pairing above.  
European capitalism acted for some time on this preference for equality, 
collective bargaining, and so on by implementing “state-defined and state-
protected status categories.”34  Those categories entail “bundle[s] of rights 
and duties, standards, licenses, mandates[,] . . . entitlements, subsidies, and 
privileges which are attached to virtually every participant in contractual 
economic transactions.”35  Applying to banks, markets, unions, wage 
determinations, the tax system, and all manner of institutions and topics,36 
these status categories constrain voluntary transactions—i.e., “the 
individual pursuit of economic gain.”37  Voluntary transactions are thus 
“‘embedded’ . . . in a set of formal . . . and informal . . . institutional 
patterns” that to one degree or another accomplish the task of 
“decommodification.”38  For example, Margaret Jane Radin describes 
national maximum-hour limitations on the workweek and a national 
prohibition on child labor as “reflect[ing] an incompletely commodified 
understanding of work.”39  Similarly, Michael Walzer has called such 
governmental policies “restraint[s] of market liberty for the sake of some 
communal conception.”40 
Prior to 1989, the establishment of such communal conceptions, market 
restraints, and social democracy was broad and popular enough that 
 
 29. Claus Offe, The European Model of “Social”Capitalism:  Can It Survive European 
Integration?, 11 J. POL. PHIL. 437, 447 (2003). 
 30. Id. at 442. 
 31. Id. at 447. 
 32. Id. at 441. 
 33. Id. 
 34. Id. at 442. 
 35. Id. 
 36. Id. 
 37. Id. at 443. 
 38. Id. 
 39.  MARGARET JANE RADIN, CONTESTED COMMODITIES:  THE TROUBLE WITH TRADE IN 
SEX, CHILDREN, BODY PARTS, AND OTHER THINGS 108 (2001). 
 40.  MICHAEL WALZER, SPHERES OF JUSTICE:  A DEFENSE OF PLURALISM AND EQUALITY 
102 (1983). 
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economic integration through European Union policies had to be justified in 
terms of social democracy.  Consider the remarks of Jacques Delors, former 
President of the European Commission, in 1988:  “It would be unacceptable 
for Europe to become a source of social regression, while we are trying to 
rediscover together the road to prosperity and employment.”41  Delors 
proclaimed that “measures adopted to complete the large market should not 
diminish the level of social protection already achieved in the member 
states.”42  He further stated that “the internal market should be designed to 
benefit each and every citizen” and it would be “necessary to improve 
worker’s [sic] living and working conditions, and to provide better 
protection for health and safety at work.”43  The measures taken by the 
European Commission to accomplish these goals would include “[t]he 
establishment of a platform of guaranteed social rights . . . such as every 
worker’s right to be covered by a collective agreement.”44  Keith Ewing 
indicates that this is how Delors persuaded some trade unionists to support 
European integration.45 
In 2003, Offe offered two competing predictions for the effect of 
European integration on European capitalism.  Perhaps, just as Delors 
promised, integration would cement, at the transnational level, the progress 
made by member states in ruling out “hostile economic rivalries” and 
“establishing [] through ‘positive’ integration . . . [a] political economy 
which serves the interests of all parties involved evenly.”46  Or instead, 
European integration might be a “device that paves the way for the ultimate 
triumph of market liberalism on the European Continent by enforcing upon 
member states the adoption of regimes of privatization, deregulation, and 
fiscal austerity.”47  This would spell an end to the ability of member states 
to “maintain the kind of protective arrangements and status order that each 
of them had built up in the course of their national history.”48 
Offe indicates that the latter course is more likely as a logical and 
operational matter: 
It is much more likely that a European-style capitalism transforms itself 
into a liberal model than that the Anglo-Saxon model becomes 
“Europeanized” (in much the same way as . . . it is easier to make a fish 
soup out of an aquarium than the other way around).  “Embeddedness” is 
a condition that is more easily lost than gained, due to its dependency 
upon supportive dispositions of a cognitive as well as moral kind.49 
 
 41. K.D. Ewing, The Death of Social Europe, 26 KING’S L.J. 76, 77 (2015). 
 42. Id. 
 43. Id. 
 44. Id. 
 45. Id. 
 46. Offe, supra note 29, at 447. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. 
 49. Id. at 446. 
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But ultimately, as of 2003, Offe wrote that it was “too early to pass 
definitive judgment on which of these diametrically opposed 
interpretations/predictions will come closer to the truth.”50 
The time to pass judgment came soon enough, however.  Ewing notes 
that the European Commission’s social democratic promises were honored 
for approximately twenty years, from roughly the fall of the Berlin Wall 
until 2010.  In 2015, Ewing declared “The Death of Social Europe.”51  “The 
contemporary focus,” Ewing wrote, “is on new economic governance 
arrangements[] and the subordination of labour rights generally.”52  He 
noted that European guidelines and treaties increasingly emphasize 
“international competitiveness,” rather than a social market or social 
justice.53  European Commission guidelines evaluate “the right framework 
conditions for wage bargaining” in terms of “competitiveness,” a mode of 
evaluation that Ewing called “a prescription for collective bargaining 
deregulation by a technocratic process about which most citizens in most 
member states are largely unaware.”54 
Ewing documents a deregulatory trend in minimum wage and collective 
bargaining in a host of countries, including Romania, Greece, and Ireland,55 
with significant deregulatory pressure in Italy, Spain, Belgium, and 
Portugal.56  His analysis culminates in substantial evidence of how the 
pursuit of “competitiveness,” “austerity,” and “free trade” have led to the 
destruction of Social Europe, an illustration of Offe’s proposition that it is 
much easier to move from social democracy to liberal democracy than the 
other way around.57 
Writing a year before Ewing, Thomas Piketty famously documented a 
thirty-year arc of rising economic inequality within capitalist states, 
including European and North American democracies.  Ewing’s analysis is 
supported by Piketty’s book, Capital in the Twenty-First Century, which 
alerted the world that capitalism has produced a radical degree of 
inequality.58  Before looking at the numbers, let us survey the causes of the 
various sources of inequality:  “inequality in income from labor; inequality 
in the ownership of capital and the income to which it gives rise; and the 
interaction between these two terms.”59  Two of the three factors60 that 
Piketty deems responsible are overtly political and would not be possible 
 
 50. Id. at 447. 
 51. Ewing, supra note 41, at 86–87. 
 52. Id. at 87. 
 53. Id. at 88. 
 54. Id. (emphasis omitted). 
 55. Id. at 90. 
 56. Id. at 89. 
 57. See generally id. 
 58. See generally THOMAS PIKETTY, CAPITAL IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY (Arthur 
Goldhammer trans., Harvard University Press 2014). 
 59. Id. at 238. 
 60. Piketty considers the other and “most important factor in the long run” to be “slower 
growth, especially demographic growth, which, together with a high rate of saving, 
automatically gives rise to a structural increase in the long-run capital/income ratio.” Id. at 
173. 
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but for the sorts of laws and policies against which social democracy was 
supposed to guard: 
[F]irst, the gradual privatization and transfer of public wealth into private 
hands in the 1970s and 1980s, and second, a long-term catch-up 
phenomenon affecting real estate and stock market prices, which also 
accelerated in the 1980s and 1990s in a political context that was on the 
whole more favorable to private wealth than that of the immediate 
postwar decades.61 
Piketty notes that “the revival of private wealth is partly due to the 
privatization of national wealth,” and that “the proportion of public capital 
in national capital has dropped sharply in recent decades.”62  In France and 
Germany between 1950 and 1970, for example, “net public wealth 
represented as much as a quarter or even a third of total national 
wealth[,] . . . whereas today it represents just a few percent.”63 
Illustrating inequality of income from labor, Piketty sketches out the 
difference between the United States and Scandinavian countries: 
[I]f the average wage is 2,000 euros a month, the egalitarian 
(Scandinavian) distribution corresponds to 4,000 euros a month for the 
top 10 percent of earners (and 10,000 for the top 1 percent), 2,250 a 
month for the 40 percent in the middle, and 1,400 a month for the bottom 
50 percent, where the more inegalitarian (US) distribution corresponds to 
a markedly steeper hierarchy:  7,000 euros a month for the top 10 percent 
(and 24,000 for the top 1 percent), 2,000 for the middle 40 percent, and 
just 1,000 for the bottom 50 percent.64 
Moving to the distribution of capital ownership, Piketty finds even greater 
inequality: 
 In the societies where wealth is most equally distributed (once again, 
the Scandinavian countries in the 1970s and 1980s), the richest 10 percent 
own around 50 percent of national wealth or even a bit more, somewhere 
between 50 and 60 percent, if one properly accounts for the largest 
fortunes.  Currently, in the early 2010s, the richest 10 percent own around 
60 percent of national wealth in most European countries, and in 
particular in France, Germany, Britain, and Italy. 
 The most striking fact is no doubt that in all these societies, half of the 
population own virtually nothing:  the poorest 50 percent invariably own 
less than 10 percent of national wealth, and generally less than 5 percent.  
In France, according to the latest available data (for 2010–2011), the 
richest 10 percent command 62 percent of total wealth, while the poorest 
50 percent own only 4 percent.65 
The United States, famous for its laissez-faire stance, has outdone all other 
advanced democracies in this regard.66  By 2010, the top 10 percent of U.S. 
 
 61. Id. (emphasis added). 
 62. Id. at 184. 
 63. Id. 
 64. Id. at 256. 
 65. Id. at 257. 
 66. See id. 
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wealth holders owned 72 percent of all national wealth.67  Piketty’s data 
expose the reality of 150 million Americans—the poorest 50 percent—
owning just 2 percent of national wealth.68  Beyond conditions favorable to 
returns on capital, Piketty also cites “an unprecedented explosion of very 
elevated incomes from labor, a veritable separation of the top managers of 
large firms from the rest of the population.”69 
Such remarkable concentrations of wealth stem from unequal outcomes 
in capital and labor independently, as well as capital over labor 
comparatively.  Piketty says that inequalities with respect to capital “are 
always extreme” compared to inequalities with respect to labor,70 but that 
“this regularity is by no means foreordained, and its existence tells us 
something important about the nature of the economic and social processes 
that shape the dynamics of capital accumulation and the distribution of 
wealth.”71  Thus, he suggests that rising inequality stems largely from 
victories for capital in the political processes of democracies and that those 
victories have provoked an extreme, unsustainable state of affairs. 
Piketty speculates that capitalism’s present distributive outcomes invite 
violent revolution.72  Noting that “such a high degree of concentration [of 
capital] is already a source of powerful political tensions, which are often 
difficult to reconcile with universal suffrage,”73 he considers it “hard to 
imagine that those at the bottom will accept the situation permanently.”74  
Piketty states that the sustainability of today’s extreme levels of inequality 
“depends not only on the effectiveness of the repressive apparatus but also, 
and perhaps primarily, on the effectiveness of the apparatus of 
justification.”75  Ideology occupies Piketty’s mind as he contemplates 
whether extreme inequality will last:  “I want to insist on this point:  the key 
issue is the justification of inequalities rather than their magnitude as 
such.”76  We must remember, it is not merely the fact of high and rising 
inequality that must be justified, but rather that “institutional and political 
differences played a key role.”77  In other words, such inequality is not 
inevitable.  It is, rather, a political choice; and the political choice to 
institute policies that further enrich the wealthy would indeed require a 
strong ideological justification. 
 
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. See also generally EMMANUEL SAEZ, U.C. BERKELEY, STRIKING IT RICHER, THE 
EVOLUTION OF TOP INCOMES IN THE UNITED STATES (2013), http://eml.berkeley.edu/~saez/ 
saez-UStopincomes-2012.pdf [https://perma.cc/TYM4-BA3L]. 
 69. PIKETTY, supra note 58, at 24. 
 70. Id. at 244. 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. at 439. 
 73. Id. at 263. 
 74. Id. 
 75. Id. 
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 77. Id. at 237 (“[I]nequality began to rise sharply again since the 1970s and 1980s, albeit 
with significant variation between countries, again suggesting that institutional and political 
differences played a key role.”). 
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If we take the most unequal of the advanced democracies, the United 
States, stunning evidence of how such political choices are made emerged 
the same month as Piketty’s study.  From a statistical analysis of policy 
outcomes across nearly 2000 issue areas, Martin Gilens and Benjamin Page 
reached the striking conclusion that “[e]conomic elites and organized 
groups representing business interests have substantial independent impacts 
on US government policy, while mass-based interest groups and average 
citizens have little or no independent influence.”78  This confirms earlier 
findings by Gilens suggesting that patterns of government responsiveness 
“often corresponded more closely to a plutocracy than to a democracy.”79  
Gilens’s prior study also showed that “when preferences across income 
groups diverged, only the most affluent appeared to influence policy 
outcomes” and that such “representational inequality was spread widely 
across policy domains, with a strong tilt toward high-income Americans on 
economic issues.”80  Their conclusion could hardly be ignored:  “America’s 
claims to being a democratic society are seriously threatened . . . [because] 
policymaking is dominated by powerful business organizations and a small 
number of affluent Americans.”81 
Meanwhile, the social democratic model of large state subsidies for 
political parties appears to have backfired.  In perhaps the leading work on 
the tyranny of political parties,82 Richard S. Katz and Peter Mair cite “a 
tendency in recent years toward[] an ever closer symbiosis between parties 
and the state[] and that this then sets the stage for the emergence of a new 
party type, which [they] identify as ‘the cartel party.’”83 
III.  CATEGORIES OF POLITICAL FINANCE 
The ancient Greeks employed the word “oligarchy” to denote a system of 
rule by the few, whose purpose they commonly understood to be 
moneymaking.84  Far from a bygone relic, oligarchy is ascendant in the 
Russian businessmen and party elites who captured the benefits of 
liberalization, Chinese officials administering capitalism to their benefit, 
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wealthy Americans who control super PACs and dominate campaign 
finance, European political parties that collude with each other to capture 
electoral subsidies and exclude minor parties that would challenge 
economic arrangements, and global financial elite that governs through 
debt.85 
Out of this great variety of oligarchic threats, only two have credibly 
justified their existence as a matter of democratic values, plutocracy and 
partyocracy.  Those justifications have obtained the status of binding law 
through constitutional drafting and constitutional interpretation.  American-
style plutocracy and European-style partyocracy have distinguished 
themselves in these regards, proving that liberal democracy and social 
democracy can both be corrupted from within.  The internal process through 
which corruption became de jure, instead of merely de facto, has unfolded 
within political finance.  Plutocracy and partyocracy emerge from particular 
configurations of these laws and derive their justifications from the 
ideologies behind liberal democracy and social democracy. 
The connection between political finance and the competition between 
liberal democracy and social democracy is immediately clear.  There are 
“[t]hree basic options facing states” with regard to political finance:  
“[l]aissez-faire and self-regulation,” “transparency or ‘non-regulatory 
intervention,’” and “regulation.”86  Choices between and within these 
categories surely depend on myriad factors, including history, geography, 
socioeconomic stratification, constitutional text, judicial review, ideology, 
electoral system, and politics.87  But what moves such factors and what 
explains the importance of the choice between regulation and laissez 
faire?88 
To begin adding the necessary context, one must look to where each of 
the categories above draws its funds.  Arthur Gunlicks offers a useful 
framework in his description of the “three types of party and campaign 
 
 85. See, e.g., MAURIZIO LAZZARATO, GOVERNING BY DEBT (2013); Azar Gat, The Return 
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 86. K.D. Ewing & Samuel Issacharoff, Introduction to PARTY FUNDING AND CAMPAIGN 
FINANCING IN INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE 2 (K.D. Ewing & Samuel Issacharoff eds., 
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finance, which lies at the heart of politics insofar as it determines how and in what quantities 
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formation of a government and a financial referendum on the performance of the prior 
government. 
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financing:  plutocratic, grassroots, and public funding.”89  These types of 
financing can be categorized as large donations from few sources, small 
donations from many sources, and half or more of all political funds coming 
from state subsidies.  The first is common in parties on the Right, the 
second in parties on the Left, and the third as a general rule throughout 
Europe.90 
Each state thus categorized is commonly home to competing tendencies 
within their political finance regime.91  Within West German political 
finance, for example, Christine Landfried found both etatization and 
capitalization to be at work.  Respectively, this signaled “the danger posed 
[from public subsidies] when parties become more dependent on the state 
than on membership dues” and “the process of increased ‘big’ donations to 
political parties in exchange for concessions and privileges.”92  With 
international, regional, national, and more localized levels of politics all 
subject to thousands of variables within each country, it is unusual for any 
one such tendency to completely eclipse the rest. 
Still, whenever the reigning factors (history, economics, politics, 
ideology, judicial review, etc.) converge, or when one or several of them 
dominate the rest, “regulatory trajectories” surface.93  Because of the 
tremendous complexity of political finance—including the many layers of 
politics from local to international, sources of money, interested parties, 
political institutions, modes of influence, and exogenous factors—it is 
difficult to isolate causal variables with precision.  In regulatory trajectories, 
Ewing and Samuel Issacharoff locate the underlying theme of all such 
variables and issues.94  Within each country, the question is whether the 
particular constellation of variables and issues is producing a move from 
laissez faire and self-regulation to regulation and state funding, or a move in 
the opposite direction. 
In observing a divide between public financing and private financing in 
North American and Western European countries, Gunlicks complicates the 
analysis by adding additional explanatory factors, such as:  federalism, 
single member district plurality electoral systems versus proportional 
representation, presidential versus parliamentary systems, and political 
culture.95  In the end, however, Gunlicks attributes those competing 
regulatory trajectories to competing political cultures, the most important 
variable in his view.  He describes two political cultures:  first, “[a]ttitudes 
generally hostile to taxes and big government, or even to government at all” 
that were “tapped and further encouraged by . . . [Ronald] Reagan,” and 
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second, attitudes that favor “lessening the influence of wealthy individuals” 
and producing “fairer, more open and equal elections.”96  Gunlicks notes 
that the second sort of political culture, clearly social democratic in nature, 
was linked to public funding by political leaders who saw subsidies as the 
means to achieving those preferences for less private wealth and greater 
equality.97 
This leads back to familiar sets of competing values—hostility to 
government and taxes (i.e., greater reliance on markets) versus fairness and 
equality concerns.  These values go a tremendous distance toward 
describing the difference between liberal democracy and social democracy, 
as noted in the previous part.  The overlap is programmatic and ideological.  
Therefore, one would also expect it to be historical.  Indeed, “North 
European social democracies” pioneered state subsidies for political parties 
in the 1950s and 1960s.98  Ewing and Issacharoff note that “[t]his was a 
period of the expanding State, in terms of budgets and functions, and the 
idea was widely adopted.”99  Then, the antiregulatory stance integral to 
plutocracy was pioneered by the U.S. Supreme Court in the mid to late 
1970s.100  Far from the ideology of North European social democracies, the 
Burger Court relied on free-market theory and veered away from the 
Warren Court’s progressive jurisprudence.101  The Roberts Court has since 
put the finishing touches on the plutocratic model of campaign finance, 
illustrating, once again, the importance of ideology—to be sure, an ideology 
that would also justify weakening the estate tax. 
IV.  PLUTOCRACY 
Karl-Heinz Nassmacher traces the label of a “plutocratic” regime of 
political finance back to 1983.102  He writes that “[w]hereas democracy is a 
political system based on equal participation by the multitude, plutocracy is 
a system dominated by the riches of an affluent minority.”103  Contrasting it 
to grass-roots financing through small donations, Nassmacher calls 
plutocratic financing “the capitalist dimension of party funding.”104  In this 
regard, Nassmacher’s definition of corruption is right on point:  “the 
clandestine exchange between two markets, the political or administrative 
market and the economic or social market.”105  The designation 
“plutocracy” simply removes the word “clandestine” from Nassmacher’s 
definition of corruption, giving us a legal market for political influence.  
 
 96. Id. at 8. 
 97. See id. 
 98. Ewing & Issacharoff, supra note 86, at 5. 
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 100. See TIMOTHY K. KUHNER, CAPITALISM V. DEMOCRACY:  MONEY IN POLITICS AND THE 
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 101. See id. 
 102. KARL-HEINZ NASSMACHER, THE FUNDING OF PARTY COMPETITION:  POLITICAL 
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 103. Id. at 239. 
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Plutocracy is distinct from kleptocracy and other forms of abject corruption 
that may amount to plutocracy in practice, but are not an official system of 
rule. 
The difference amounts to that between what is merely practiced and that 
which is both practiced and honored.  Consider, for example, this exchange 
between Socrates and Adeimantus: 
Socrates:  Surely, when wealth and the wealthy are honoured in the city, 
virtue and the good men are less honourable. 
Adeimantus:  Plainly. 
Socrates:  Surely, what happens to be honoured is practiced, and what is 
without honour is neglected.106 
As a response to Socrates, consider Justice Alito’s majority opinion in the 
2008 case Davis v. FEC.107  Here, the Court struck down a provision of the 
McCain-Feingold Act that helped candidates who ran against wealthy, self-
financing opponents.  The problem was the provision’s function of leveling 
the power of wealth.108  “Leveling electoral opportunities,” wrote Justice 
Alito for the majority, “means making and implementing judgments about 
which strengths should be permitted to contribute to the outcome of an 
election.”109  He went on to list candidates’ strengths:  “[s]ome are wealthy; 
others have wealthy supporters who are willing to make large contributions.  
Some are celebrities; some have the benefit of a well-known family 
name.”110  That was Justice Alito’s exhaustive list.  There was no mention 
of democratic strengths, only those that relate to wealth, fame from the 
entertainment industry, and family privilege.  The reform at issue was held 
unconstitutional in its attempt “to reduce the natural advantage that 
wealthy individuals possess in campaigns for federal office.”111 
This and other Supreme Court decisions have created a plutocracy not 
just by striking down numerous campaign finance reforms, but also by 
providing justificatory claims that serve to legitimize and even honor a 
controlling role for wealth in democracy.  Although those claims are often 
weak and even farcical, they fit with key components of Systems 
Justification Theory discussed by Professor Maynard:  “an underlying 
human need to support and defend the social status quo . . . justifying and 
defending the existing dominance of the wealthy in society”112 and the 
manifestation of that need in legal decisions that “reflect[] the notion that, 
contrary to our apparent commitment to equal opportunity, we value and 
encourage wealth accumulation.”113  In the 2010 case Citizens United v. 
FEC,114 the Court struck down a prohibition on corporate general treasury 
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spending in the weeks leading up to an election.  In his majority opinion, 
Justice Kennedy stated, “It is irrelevant for First Amendment purposes that 
corporate funds may ‘have little or no correlation to the public’s support for 
the corporation’s political ideas.’”115  “All speakers,” the Court announced, 
“use money amassed from the economic market-place”116 and “[m]any 
persons can trace their funds to corporations, if not in the form of donations, 
then in the form of dividends, interest, or salary.”117  Here, the Court 
admitted that its self-styled political marketplace operated through the 
economic marketplace, importing uneven outcomes in dividends, interests, 
and salaries into the political sphere.  Discussing the effects of corporate 
expenditures, the Court claimed that “influence over or access to elected 
officials does not mean that these officials are corrupt.”118 
The following year, the Court struck down perhaps the most effective 
public financing system in the fifty states, Arizona’s matching funds 
provision.119  The Court wrote that the matching funds system burdens the 
exercise of the “First Amendment right to make unlimited expenditures,” 
because it enables one’s opponents to raise more money.120  From the 
perspective of a donor, spender, or privately financed candidate, that burden 
arises from his opponents’ ability to use matching funds “to finance speech 
that counteract[s] and thus diminishe[s] the effectiveness of [his] own 
speech.”121  To the contention that “[p]roviding additional funds to 
petitioners’ opponents does not make petitioners’ own speech any less 
effective,”122 the Court replied, “Of course it does. . . .  All else being equal, 
an advertisement supporting the election of a candidate that goes without a 
response is often more effective than an advertisement that is directly 
controverted.”123 
In 2014, this line of cases culminated with McCutcheon v. FEC,124 which 
laid out a blueprint for plutocracy: 
[G]overnment regulation may not target the general gratitude a candidate 
may feel toward those who support him or his allies, or the political 
access such support may afford.  “Ingratiation and access . . . are not 
corruption.”  They embody a central feature of democracy—that 
constituents support candidates who share their beliefs and interests, and 
candidates who are elected can be expected to be responsive to those 
concerns.125 
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With these words, the Court redefined representative democracy as 
attention by officeholders and candidates to the interests of their financial 
contributors. 
To ensure that political representation on the basis of financial power 
would not be disturbed, the Court reminded its readers: 
[W]e have made clear that Congress may not regulate contributions 
simply to reduce the amount of money in politics, or to restrict the 
political participation of some in order to enhance the relative influence of 
others.126 
  . . .  
No matter how desirable it may seem, it is not an acceptable 
governmental objective to “level the playing field,” or to “level electoral 
opportunities,” or to “equalize the financial resources of candidates.”127 
These remarks stand as the reasoning for the Court’s decision to strike 
down a $123,200 limit on each individual’s campaign donations per two-
year election cycle.128  With that limit in place, each donor’s financial reach 
was meaningfully restricted.  Each donor could only give the maximum 
amounts—$2600 per candidate per cycle, $32,400 per year to a national 
party committee, $10,000 to a state or local party committee, and $5000 to 
a political action committee—before running up against the aggregate two-
year limits of $48,600 to federal candidates and $74,600 to other political 
committees.129  Declaring these aggregate limits unconstitutional, the Court 
ushered in a new era of multimillion dollar donors, sums not seen since 
Watergate.  As Justice Breyer’s dissenting opinion put it, “[W]ithout an 
aggregate limit, the law will permit a wealthy individual to write a check, 
over a two-year election cycle, for $3.6 million—all to benefit his political 
party and its candidates.”130 
As though sensing that some normative justification was needed for 
ushering back in the era of the plutocrat donor, the majority ventured an 
equivalency between the likes of the Koch Brothers and a famous American 
patriot and revolutionary: 
First Amendment rights are important regardless whether the individual 
is, on the one hand, a “lone pamphleteer[] or street corner orator[] in the 
Tom Paine mold,” or is, on the other, someone who spends “substantial 
amounts of money in order to communicate [his] political ideas through 
sophisticated” means.131 
Anyone aware of Thomas Paine’s views on equality, however, would find 
this historical comparison objectionable.  Beyond the American Revolution, 
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Paine was also active in the French Revolution and a member of the French 
National Convention.  “France has had the honor of adding to the word 
Liberty that of Equality,” he wrote.132  At a time when suffrage was 
premised on property ownership—which proved to be a powerful means of 
political exclusion in the United States—Paine opposed the property 
requirement and extensive property rights more generally, describing the 
landed monopoly as having “dispossessed more than half the inhabitants of 
every nation of their natural inheritance.”133 
That landed monopoly so reviled by Paine is not substantially different in 
principle than the financial monopoly of big donors and spenders that 
Citizens United and McCutcheon privilege.  Let us consider the underlying 
state of democracy that the U.S. Supreme Court is causing and defending, 
beginning with outside expenditures.  Take two of the largest super PACs 
that operated in the 2014 elections:  the Senate Majority PAC (liberal) and 
American Crossroads (conservative).  Two-thirds of the $90 million that 
they raised came in donations of $500,000 or more, meaning that less than 
200 donors provided the great majority of funds.134  The same can be said 
of the $1.1 billion in outside spending during the 2012 elections:  the top 
200 donors to outside expenditure groups supplied approximately 80 
percent of all the money.135  Those 200 people represent 0.000084 percent 
of the adult population, meaning that the outside speech environment was 
shaped (if not controlled) by an unfathomably small portion of Americans. 
Turning from outside advertisements to the funding of campaigns, one 
finds similar dynamics of concentrated influence and rising costs.  While 
not as small as the percentage of Americans funding super PACs, the great 
majority of campaign donations since 1992 have been controlled by less 
than 1 percent of the U.S. population.136  In the 2014 elections, just 0.3 
percent of the adult population supplied 66 percent of the sum total of 
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cash.137  The rise in total campaign donations has been striking, albeit not 
as extreme as the rise in outside expenditures.  Between 2000 and 2012, for 
example, the total amount raised by both presidential finalists rose from 
$325 million (Bush versus Gore) to $2 billion (Romney versus Obama), an 
increase of over 600 percent.138  The direction of change is constant, with 
each presidential race significantly surpassing the cost of the one before it. 
By 2012, the average price tag of political office had reached alarming 
levels:  approximately $1 billion for the presidency,139 over $10.4 million 
for a Senate seat, and $1.6 million for a seat in the House of 
Representatives.140  And again, even in the election years with the deepest 
donor base, less than 0.6 percent of all citizens of voting age supplied most 
of the money—that would be just 1.5 million out of 270 million American 
adults today.  In the 2014 elections, however, at a rate of 0.3 percent, just 
over 500,000 citizens provided the great majority of funds.  In total, these 
statistics convey the essential fact of political finance in the United States:  
privatization.  All of this makes Gilens and Page’s findings141 entirely 
predictable and, apparently, entirely unobjectionable to the current Supreme 
Court majority. 
As anti-plutocratic dimensions of political finance jurisprudence, 
consider these foreign court points of contrast with the U.S. Supreme Court.  
In political finance cases, the Supreme Court of Canada has long held that 
“the political equality of citizens [] is at the heart of a free and democratic 
society.”142  Similarly, the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) 
concluded in Bowman v. United Kingdom143 that “securing equality 
between candidates” falls within “the legitimate aim of protecting the rights 
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of others, namely the candidates for election and the electorate.”144  
Validating a prohibition on ads by social advocacy groups in Animal 
Defenders International v. United Kingdom,145 decided three years after 
Citizens United, the ECtHR agreed that the ban “was necessary to prevent 
the distortion of crucial public-interest debates” by unequal access to 
influential media by financially powerful bodies.146  The court accepted the 
argument that this function “protect[ed] effective pluralism and the 
democratic process.”147  It worried that “powerful financial 
groups . . . could obtain competitive advantages in the area of paid 
advertising and thereby curtail a free and pluralist debate, of which the State 
remains the ultimate guarantor.”148 
Perhaps the starkest contrast came in September of 2015, when the 
Supreme Federal Tribunal of Brazil banned corporate donations to political 
parties.149  The Brazilian context is similar to that of the United States in a 
number of ways—a large geographic area, a high population, candidate-
centered elections, and a history of expensive campaigns.150  And similar to 
the U.S. panorama of roughly half a percent of adult citizens supplying 
most of the funds relied upon by political parties and just 0.000084 percent 
of adult citizens supplying most of the funds relied upon by independent 
expenditure groups, Brazil has seen a clear plutocratic dimension in 
political finance, as noted by Maria D’Alva Gil Kinzo: 
[T]he main method of funding campaigns in Brazil is through private 
firms—especially those in the civil construction and banking 
sectors. . . .  In the [1994] presidential election, 93 per cent of private 
contributions to the eventual winner came from business 
donations. . . .  The staggering role played by business in financing 
campaigns is not limited to parties on the right . . . even in the case of 
Lula—the Workers’ Party presidential candidate—private firms’ 
contributions amounted to 41 per cent of this party’s total expenditure.151 
D’Alva goes on to list many elections where private sources provided 94 to 
99 percent of total campaign funds.  Writing thirteen years before D’Alva, 
Roberto Aguiar noted that “campaigns are funded mainly by bankers, 
industrialists, traders, and livestock breeders. . . .  [T]he way in which 
power is structured in Brazil has led to its concentration in the hands of a 
few.”152 
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Deciding the case in 2015, the Supreme Federal Tribunal faced up to an 
especially powerful political panorama.  In the 2014 election campaigns for 
the presidency, Senate, and Congress, “[a]round 76% of the over R$3bn 
($760m) donated . . . came from corporate entities” and that money was 
fairly equally distributed between “the ruling leftwing Partido dos 
Trabalhadores (PT) and the main opposition Partido da Social Democracia 
Brasileira (PSDB),” suggesting that corporations were hedging their bets.153  
A 2014 study by Taylor Boas, F. Daniel Hidalgo, and Neal P. Richardson 
found that corporate donors to the PT in the 2006 elections received 
between fourteen and thirty-nine times the value of their donations in 
government contracts.154 
The Brazilian ministers who voted 8-3 to strike down corporate 
donations perceived the problem not just as one of corruption, but of 
plutocracy.  Their reasoning would have sent shockwaves through the U.S. 
Supreme Court.  Noting the high percentage of corporate money behind 
campaigns, the President of the court, Minister Dias Toffolli, called 
corporate finance a “distortion of democracy.”155  Minister Marco Aurélio 
elaborated, noting that “Brazil is experiencing a profound crisis of political 
representation marked by the increasing distance between social claims and 
concerns, on the one hand, and the concrete actions of political leaders on 
the other.”156  He stated that “the value of political equality had been 
replaced by the wealth of large firms that give donations in order to control 
the electoral process.”157  On this basis, he ventured that “we do not live in 
an authentic democracy, but rather a plutocracy—a political system in 
which power is exercised by the wealthiest group, leading to the exclusion 
of the less fortunate.”158  Minister Aurélio’s conclusion affirmed that “we 
are living in a historic moment [in which] the private financing of electoral 
campaigns and political parties has not allowed democracy to be affirmed 
as a fundamental right.”  “[I]f democracy is a fundamental right,” he 
concluded, “then plutocracy, now in force within our political-electoral 
system, is a violation of that right.”159 
Minister Luiz Fux, the reporter for the case, confirmed that “there truly 
exists a representative crisis in the country, juxtaposing citizens, ever more 
skeptical about their elected officials, with members of the political class 
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who often privilege their own particular interests to the detriment of the 
public interest.”160  Finishing off the contrast between the Brazilian and 
U.S. high courts with a literary flare, Minister Rosa Weber remarked, “The 
influence of economic power culminates by turning the electoral process 
into a political game of marked cards, an odious pantomime that turns the 
voter into a puppet, crumbling in one blow citizenship and democracy.”161 
These remarks from Brazilian high court judges, as well as those from 
their European and Canadian counterparts described above, illustrate how 
far toward a strange, parallel universe the U.S. Supreme Court has travelled.  
Construing equality concerns as “wholly foreign to the First 
Amendment,”162 restraints on general treasury fund spending as 
unconstitutional in “muffl[ing] the voices that best represent the most 
significant segments of the economy,”163 and a concern over the undue 
influence of aggregated wealth as “interfer[ing] with the ‘open marketplace’ 
of ideas protected by the First Amendment,”164 the U.S. Supreme Court has 
constructed a neoliberal constitutional world, distant from most other 
advanced democracies.  As though to leave no doubt whatsoever, Chief 
Justice Roberts and Justice Alito wrote, “First Amendment rights could be 
confined to individuals, subverting the vibrant public discourse that is at the 
foundation of our democracy.”165 
This constitutional interpretation of freedom and constitutional 
destruction of equality perfectly exemplifies Piketty’s point that radical 
economic inequality is built upon a political foundation and Wendy 
Brown’s contentions that “inequality . . . is the medium and relation of 
competing capitals”166 and that “neoliberal reason . . . in 
jurisprudence . . . is converting the distinctly political character, meaning 
and operation of democracy’s constituent elements into economic ones.”167  
Brown’s conclusion:  “Liberal democratic institutions, practices, and habits 
may not survive this conversion.”168 
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CONCLUSION 
Political finance regimes, such as plutocracy, that exclude the general 
public and empower elites should be on everyone’s mind.  They limit the 
ability of ordinary citizens to adjust the institutions, laws, and policies that 
have led to today’s radical concentrations of wealth.  Beyond the material 
constraint of elite control over democracy, plutocracy has also imposed 
ideological constraints, transforming the meaning of speech, citizenship, 
equality, and democracy under the guises of constitutional interpretation.  
The struggle for greater political equality must engage with both sets of 
causes—material and ideological alike.  And if those material and 
ideological causes are common to the struggle for greater economic equality 
as well, as seen in the debates over the estate tax, then reformers from 
various camps would be wise to join forces.  Because neoliberalism has 
been consolidated through capturing interwoven bodies of law and policy, 
the unstitching process ought to proceed along collective lines as well.  This 
Article suggests that the first threads to be pulled should be the ideological 
justifications for political and economic inequality presently masquerading 
as constitutional law. 
